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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The United States Supreme Court sustained the Federal Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 20101 based on Chief Justice John G. 
Roberts, Jr.’s majority opinion in National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius.2  The decision was feted by President Obama, liberal 
politicians, activists, and citizens who feared the Supreme Court would use 
its judicial review powers to invalidate the signature achievement of the 
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 1. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119.  
 2. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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United States’ forty-fourth President.  Unsurprisingly, the decision 
disappointed many conservatives, who expected the Court to exercise its 
judicial review power to invalidate what is arguably the most important and 
ambitious piece of federal social welfare legislation signed into law by any 
President since the Great Society Era.  The Act is very unpopular with 
conservatives and right-wing media pundits because it was signed into law 
by a Democratic President in a country with increasingly pronounced 
partisan political cleavages and because it substantially reallocates resources 
in an industry that already consumes nearly one-fifth of the nation’s gross 
domestic product. 3   Opponents of the Act seized on the “individual 
mandate,” which requires federal income tax-paying individuals to “ensure 
that the individual, and any dependent of the individual who is an applicable 
individual, is covered under minimum essential coverage . . . from private 
health insurance companies4  or pay what the Act describes as a “shared 
responsibility payment” or “penalty” directly to the Internal Revenue Service 
of the United States Treasury Department (“IRS”).5    
Although Chief Justice Roberts has come under attack from select 
conservatives for upholding the Act from a constitutional challenge brought 
by a collection of plaintiffs that includes 26 states, I argue that his majority 
decision effectively hamstrings the federal government’s power in a manner 
consistent with both conservatism and federalism because Congress will now 
have less power to both enact social welfare legislation and require States to 
comply with the implementation of federally-funded programs.  Moreover, 
since Chief Justice Roberts’s decision to uphold the Act greatly pleased the 
President, liberal politicians, activists, and citizens, the decision shrewdly 
narrows the federal government’s powers while enhancing the Court’s 
reputation with the center-left of the American political culture.  Thus, it 
safeguarded the Court’s institutional prestige.  In short, Chief Justice 
Roberts’s decision is reminiscent of our greatest Chief Justice’s decision in 
Marbury v. Madison.6  Like Chief Justice John Marshall, who earned the 
Jefferson Administration’s acquiescence in a decision that established the 
Court’s judicial review power and presaged the judiciary’s current status as 
an equal branch of government, Chief Justice Roberts avoided a 
confrontation with the Obama Administration, enhanced the Court’s 
standing, and articulated a decision that greatly narrows the national 
government’s power under both the Commerce Clause and the Tenth 
Amendment.  He did this by shrewdly finding a means of sustaining the Act 
while articulating a jurisprudence that is activist, conservative, and federalist. 
                                                           
 3. Policy Basics: Where Do Our Federal Tax Dollars Go?, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY BASICS 
(Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1258.  
 4. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2010).  
 5. Id. § 5000A(b)(1). 
 6. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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II.  THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT OF 2010 
 
The Act was passed by both houses of Congress and signed into law by 
President Obama in 2010 after a highly bruising debate that many pundits 
believe cost Democratic Party control of the House of Representatives and 
Nancy Pelosi her position as House Speaker after the November 2010 
mid-term elections.7  Chief Justice Roberts, in describing the Act, writes: 
 
The Act aims to increase the number of Americans covered by 
health insurance and decrease the cost of health care.  The Act's 
10 titles stretch over 900 pages and contain hundreds of 
provisions.  This case concerns constitutional challenges to two 
key provisions, commonly referred to as the individual mandate 
and the Medicaid expansion.8  
 
A. The Individual’s Role 
 
In describing the individual mandate, Chief Justice Roberts writes: 
 
The individual mandate requires most Americans to maintain 
“minimum essential” health insurance coverage.  The mandate 
does not apply to some individuals, such as prisoners and 
undocumented aliens.  Many individuals will receive the required 
coverage through their employer, or from a government program 
such as Medicaid or Medicare.  But for individuals who are not 
exempt and do not receive health insurance through a third party, 
the means of satisfying the requirement is to purchase insurance 
from a private company.9 
 
According to the Act, those who fail to purchase insurance must pay a 
“shared responsibility payment” or “penalty” to the IRS that is calculated as 
a percentage of household income.10  Chief Justice Roberts writes that the 
“shared responsibility payment” is: 
 
[S]ubject to a floor based on a specified dollar amount and a 
ceiling based on the average annual premium the individual 
would have to pay for qualifying private health insurance.  In 
                                                           
 7. See Jay Cost, Health Care Reform Has Endangered the Democratic Majority, REAL CLEAR 
POLITICS HORSE RACE BLOG (Aug. 31, 2010, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/horseraceblog/2010/08/health_care_reform_has_endange_1.html.  
 8. Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. at 2580. 
 9. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 10. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1), (c). 
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2016, for example, the penalty will be 2.5 percent of an 
individual's household income, but no less than $695 and no more 
than the average yearly premium for insurance that covers 60 
percent of the cost of 10 specified services (e.g., prescription 
drugs and hospitalization).  The Act provides that the penalty will 
be paid to the Internal Revenue Service with an individual's taxes, 
and “shall be assessed and collected in the same manner” as tax 
penalties, such as the penalty for claiming too large an income tax 
refund.  The Act, however, bars the IRS from using several of its 
normal enforcement tools, such as criminal prosecutions and 
levies.  And some individuals who are subject to the mandate are 
nonetheless exempt from the penalty—for example, those with 
income below a certain threshold and members of Indian tribes.11 
 
In short, the Act’s individual mandate requires those with incomes that 
subject them to the federal income tax to either purchase basic health 
insurance, or make a payment to the IRS when filing their tax returns.12  The 
individual mandate was initially resisted by the Obama Administration, but it 
was eventually included because the Act prevents insurers from either 
denying insurance coverage or charging higher insurance premiums to 
individuals with preexisting conditions.13  This would, absent the individual 
mandate, incentivize individuals to delay health insurance purchases until 
absolutely necessary.  Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, writes: 
 
The minimum coverage provision is thus “an essential par[t] of a 
larger regulation of economic activity”; without the provision, 
“the regulatory scheme would be undercut.”  Put differently, the 
minimum coverage provision, together with the guaranteed-issue 
and community-rating requirements, is “‘reasonably adapted’ to 
the attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power”: 
the elimination of pricing and sales practices that take an 
applicant's medical history into account.14 
 
In effect, the Act’s most popular requirement—that insurance companies 
will no longer either deny coverage or charge higher insurance premiums to 
                                                           
 11. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2580 (internal citations omitted). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Ezra Klein, There Was a Reason Conservatives Once Supported the Individual Mandate, WASH. 
POST WONKBLOG (Mar. 31, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-
klein/post/there-was-a-reason-conservatives-once-supported-the-individual-
mandate/2012/03/31/gIQAiddnlS_blog.html. 
 14. NFIB, 132 S. Ct.  at 2626  (quoting Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 24–25, 37 (2005) (Scalia, J. 
concurring)) (internal citations omitted). 
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those with preexisting conditions—necessitated its least popular and most 
controversial provision:  the individual mandate.  
 
B. The Several States’ Role 
 
The Act’s Medicaid expansion requires States to increase their Medicaid 
rolls to cover all individuals under 65 years of age whose incomes are below 
133% of federal poverty levels by the year 2014.15  The federal government 
will cover 100% of the cost of this Medicaid expansion through the year 
2016 and gradually reduce the subsidy until it is no less than 90% of the 
program cost.16  Under the Act, States refusing to participate in the Medicaid 
expansion may lose the entirety of their existing federal Medicaid subsidies, 
a provision that may leave the States with no alternative but to participate.17 
The Act seeks to approximate universal health insurance in the United 
States by greatly expanding Medicaid eligibility at the State level, providing 
federal insurance subsidies to individuals (not discussed in the decision), 
disallowing insurance companies from either refusing to cover or charging 
higher premiums to individuals with preexisting medical conditions, and 
facilitating this regulation’s implementation while ostensibly reducing the 
cost of health insurance for the rest of the American population by way of the 
individual mandate.   
 
III.  REACTIONS TO ORAL ARGUMENT 
 
Oral Argument on the Act’s constitutionality was held from March 26–
28, 2012 at the Supreme Court.  Court “watchers” immediately forecasted a 
negative outcome for the United States and Solicitor General Donald B. 
Verrilli, Jr.  The CNN and New Yorker Magazine Supreme Court analyst, 
Jeffrey Toobin, called Mr. Verrilli’s oral argument before the Court “a train 
wreck for the Obama Administration” and predicted the individual mandate 
would be stricken as unconstitutional.18  In an article that appeared in the 
May 10, 2012 New York Review of Books, the late Ronald Dworkin writes: 
 
Analysts at first predicted a 7–2 decision rejecting the challenge. 
But they apparently misjudged the dedication of the 
ultraconservative justices, whose questions in the oral argument 
                                                           
 15. Id. at 2601.  Presently, States, on average, cover employed parents who earn up to 63% of federal 
poverty guidelines. 
 16. Id. at 2601. 
 17. Id. at 2657. 
 18. CNN’s Jeffrey Toobin Calls David Verilli’s Oral Argument Before the Supreme Court Tuesday a 
Train Wreck for the Obama Administration, STROKES OF CANDOR (Mar. 27, 2012), 
http://strokesofcandor.com/us-politics/cnns-jeffrey-toobin-calls-verilli-oral-argument-before-supreme-
court-a-train-wreck-for-obama/. 
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have now convinced many commentators that on the contrary, in 
spite of text precedent, and principle, the Court will declare the 
act unconstitutional in June, by a 5–4 vote.19 
 
These early predictions were based on both the overall tenor of the oral 
argument and by the questions posed by Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy, 
seen by many as the Court’s only “swing vote” since the resignation of 
former Associate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who was replaced by the 
more conservative Samuel A. Alito, Jr.  Professor Dworkin writes, “There is 
still reason to hope . . . that Justice Anthony Kennedy, often the swing vote 
between liberals and ultraconservatives, will have sufficient respect for 
congressional authority to save the act.”20 
Following the oral argument, President Obama, at an April 1, 2012 joint 
White House press conference with both Mexican President Felipe Calderon 
and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, stated: 
 
Ultimately, I am confident that the Supreme Court will not take 
what would be an unprecedented, extraordinary step of 
overturning a law that was passed by a strong majority of a 
democratically elected Congress . . . . 
 
 . . .  
 
And I'd just remind conservative commentators that, for years, 
what we have heard is, the biggest problem on the bench was 
judicial activism, or a lack of judicial restraint, that an unelected 
group of people would somehow overturn a duly constituted and 
passed law . . . Well, this is a good example, and I'm pretty 
confident that this court will recognize that and not take that 
step[.]21 
 
He made these comments despairing that the Act may not survive 
judicial review.  Some conservatives interpreted President Obama’s remarks 
as intimidation and a veiled threat to attack the Court in the forthcoming 
election should the Act be overturned.22  In fact, since the Court’s recent 
                                                           
 19. Ronald Dworkin, Why the Mandate is Constitutional: The Real Argument, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, 
May 10, 2012, at 4, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/may/10/why-mandate-
constitutional-real-argument/?pagination=false.  
 20. Id.  
 21. Jeff Mason, Obama Takes a Shot at Supreme Court Over Healthcare, REUTERS (Apr. 2, 2012, 6:45 
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/02/us-obama-healthcare-idUSBRE8310WP20120402.  
 22. Ruth Marcus, Op. Ed., Obama’s unsettling attack on the Supreme Court, WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 
2012, 5:45 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/post/obamas-unsettling-attack-on-
the-supreme-court/2012/04/02/gIQA4BXYrS_blog.html. 
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decisions of Bush v. Gore 23  and Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission, 24  many on the American left, including the President, 
bemoaned what they perceived to be the Court’s partisan use of judicial 
activism to move the country in a rightward political direction.25  
These liberal sentiments were heightened after oral argument because the 
use of judicial review to invalidate the Act would have been the first use of 
this power since the New Deal era to invalidate a president’s signature piece 
of domestic legislation.  Unlike other statutes previously invalidated by the 
Court’s judicial review, the Act consumed the entire political culture for 
nearly two years at great political cost.  In effect, had the Act been stricken, it 
risked further delegitimizing the Court in the eyes of progressives and 
liberals, and politicizing the Court’s legitimacy in advance of the November 
2012 general election. 
An immediate dilemma confronted the Chief Justice Roberts:  sustain the 
Act in a manner that endorsed the Obama Administration’s position or assert 
his constitutional jurisprudence at the risk of politically damaging the Court.  
As set forth more fully below, he did neither.  Chief Justice Roberts’s adept 
maneuvering around the problem brings to mind the country’s greatest chief 
justice, Chief Justice Marshall, who, with the acquiescence of the national 
government’s political branches, created the Court’s judicial review power.  
 
IV.  THE CREATION OF THE COURT’S JUDICIAL REVIEW POWER 
 
When the Federalist Virginian, John Marshall, was appointed Chief 
Justice by President John Adams, the Court was seen as the weakest of the 
three branches of government and lacked the authority to invalidate 
unconstitutional acts of Congress.  The Constitution’s text evidenced the 
Founders’ relatively low opinion of the Court.  For example, Article III, 
Section One allows the Congress to disestablish all inferior federal courts if it 
so chooses and Article III, Section Two allows the Congress to pass 
legislation limiting the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.  
Chief Justice Marshall’s genius in Marbury26 was to earn the Jefferson 
Administration’s acquiescence in a decision that established the Court’s 
judicial review power and adumbrated the judiciary’s eventual status as an 
equal branch of the national government.  
 
 
                                                           
 23. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 24. 558 U.S. 50 (2010). 
 25. William Galston, Don’t Campaign Against the Supreme Court, Mr. President, NEW REPUBLIC, 
Apr. 5, 2012, http://www.tnr.com/article/the-vital-center/102372/obama-supreme-court-campaign-issue-
scotus.  
 26. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  
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A. Marbury v. Madison 
 
The fiercely contested 1800 Presidential election resulted in Thomas 
Jefferson defeating the incumbent, Federalist John Adams. 27  
Notwithstanding this result, the defeated incumbent, Adams, in January 
1801, nominated his Secretary of State, John Marshall, to serve as United 
States Chief Justice. 28   Marshall, a Federalist like Adams, sought to 
strengthen the Federalist position as much as possible before the Republican 
Jefferson Administration took office in March 1801.29 
On February 13, 1801, Congress passed and President Adams signed the 
Circuit Judge Act that reduced the number of Supreme Court justices from 
six to five, thereby decreasing the opportunity for Republican control of the 
Court because the retirement of two Court justices was now required before 
President-elect Jefferson could make any Court appointments.30  
On February 27, 1801, less than a week before Adams’ Presidential term 
ended, Congress adopted the Organic Act of the District of Columbia that 
authorized President Adams to appoint 42 justices of the peace.31  Adams 
announced and the Senate confirmed his nominations in the days preceding 
Jefferson’s March 1801 inauguration as President.32  
Justice Marshall, acting as Secretary of State, signed the commissions 
and dispatched his brother, James Marshall, to effectuate delivery.33  A few 
commissions, including one for William Marbury, were not delivered before 
Jefferson’s inauguration and when President Jefferson took office, he 
instructed the incoming Secretary of State, James Madison, to withhold the 
remaining commissions.34  Marbury, feeling wronged, filed suit in the United 
States Supreme Court under the Judiciary Act of 1798, seeking a writ of 
mandamus to compel Madison to complete delivery of his commission.35  
The Court heard the case in 1803.36 
If Chief Justice Marshall’s goal was to merely adjudicate the case, he 
could have denied Marbury’s request on legality principal grounds because 
the Judiciary Act unconstitutionally gave him standing to commence suit in 
the Court.  Instead, in an ingenious decision that created the Court’s judicial 
review power, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that Marbury was entitled to 
the commission and that President Jefferson was wrong to deny it to him.  
However, he refused Marbury’s request for the commission because he 
                                                           
 27. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 37–45 (4th ed. 2011). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
2013 CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN “MARSHALL” ROBERTS 9 
concluded the Judiciary Act unconstitutionally gave the Court original 
jurisdiction to hear a mandamus proceeding when such authority is nowhere 
found in the Constitution’s Article III.  He concluded the Court can only hear 
original cases enumerated in the Constitution’s text and this original 
jurisdiction could not be expanded by a statute such as the Judiciary Act.37  Is 
this a correct interpretation of Article III?  Probably not, except Chief Justice 
Marshall’s genius was to know the Jefferson Administration would disregard 
any decision in Marbury’s favor and this would permanently undermine the 
Court’s prestige.38  
By concluding that Marbury was entitled to the commission, yet had no 
means of redress before the Court, Justice Marshall ingeniously established 
the Court’s judicial review power over both executive and legislative actions 
in a manner acceptable to the Jefferson Administration.39   
Chief Justice Marshall, however, knew that an extensive use of judicial 
review would risk undermining the Court’s authority.40  Indeed, Marbury 
was the only case in which Chief Justice Marshall invoked the Court’s 
judicial review power to invalidate a Congressional statute until Chief Justice 
Taney invalidated the Missouri Compromise in Dred Scott.41 
 
V.  CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS’S DECISION 
 
The Court heard oral argument on the Act’s constitutionality in a 
politically charged and polarized environment that has characterized post-
Cold War America.  Problems related to the partisan environment were 
compounded by an overall drop in the Court’s approval ratings with the 
American public, from 66% in the late 1980s to 44% in June 2012.42  Chief 
Justice Roberts might have attributed this drop in popularity, in part, to a 
perception among progressives that it had actively used its judicial review 
powers in a manner favoring the Republican Party.43  Indeed, during his 2010 
State of the Union Address to both Houses of Congress, President Obama, 
expressing his disagreement with Citizens United, said the decision will 
“open the floodgates for special interests—including foreign companies—to 
spend without limit in our elections . . . I don’t think American elections 
                                                           
 37. Id. 
 38. Id.  I recognize the Kansas Nebraska Act of 1854 had the effect of repealing the Missouri 
Compromise notwithstanding Chief Justice Taney’s decision. 
 39. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Adam Liptak & Allison Kopocki, Approval Rating for Justices Hits Just 44% in New Poll,  N.Y. 
TIMES, June 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/08/us/politics/44-percent-of-americans-approve-
of-supreme-court-in-new-poll.html?pagewanted=all.  
 43. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310 (invalidating much of the McCain-Feingold campaign finance 
law); Bush, 531 U.S. at 98 (ending the Florida vote recount and thereby deciding the 2000 Presidential 
election). 
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should be bankrolled by America’s most powerful interests.”44  He went on 
to urge Congress to “pass a bill that helps correct some of these problems.”45 
Recognizing the risk of an election campaign that attacked the Court’s 
legitimacy, Chief Justice Roberts, like Chief Justice Marshall before him, 
found an ingenious means of both strengthening the Court’s institutional 
prestige and furthering his jurisprudential goals.  This was not necessarily 
Chief Justice Roberts’s position from the inception.  Might his decision have 
been different if the President himself did not signal his intention to politicize 
the Court’s jurisprudence in the forthcoming Presidential election?  Also, to 
what degree was his decision to uphold the Act prompted by the relative 
extremism of the Court’s four remaining conservative justices, whose joint 
dissent would have invalidated the entire Act?46  CBS News’ Jan Crawford 
reported the Chief Justice Roberts initially voted in chambers to strike down 
the individual mandate but then changed his mind and refused the 
conservative bloc of associate justices’ repeated overtures to join their 
decision and invalidate the entire Act. 47 
Indeed, if the Chief Justice’s goal was to merely uphold the Act, he need 
only, on legality principal grounds, have discussed the constitutionality of the 
individual mandate under Congress’s Taxing and Spending Power and 
avoided mention of Congress’s power to pass the Act under the Commerce 
Clause.  By issuing a decision invalidating the Act under the Commerce 
Clause, upholding the Act under the Taxing and Spending Clause and then 
narrowing the national government’s powers vis a vis the several States by 
enlarging the meaning of Tenth Amendment, the Chief Justice avoided a 
direct confrontation with the Obama Administration, solidified the Court’s 
prestige with the American public, and articulated a jurisprudence that is 
activist, conservative, and federalist.  Like his greatest predecessor in 
Marbury, the Chief Justice co-opted the executive in a decision that both 
enhances the Court’s institutional prestige and furthers his jurisprudential 
objectives. 
 
A. The Decision Concludes the Individual Mandate is Unconstitutional 
Under the Commerce Clause 
 
Chief Justice Roberts’s decision commenced with a detailed explanation 
as to why the Act did not pass the Commerce Clause test.  This explains why 
                                                           
 44. Linda Greenhouse, Opinionator, Justice Alito’s Reaction, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2010, 11:18 PM), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/27/justice-alitos-reaction/. 
 45. Id.  
 46. Linda Greenhouse, Opinionator, The Mystery of John Roberts, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 11, 2010, 9:00 
PM),   http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/11/the-mystery-of-john-roberts/?hp. 
47. Jan Crawford, Roberts Switched Views to Uphold Health Care Law, FACE THE NATION (July 1, 2012 
1:29 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57464549/roberts-switched-views-to-uphold-health-
care-law/. 
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many news organizations such as CNN and Fox News initially incorrectly 
reported that the Act was invalidated by Chief Justice Roberts’s majority 
decision.  In particular, the decision reads as follows: 
 
The individual mandate, however, does not regulate existing 
commercial activity.  It instead compels individuals to become 
active in commerce by purchasing a product, on the ground that 
their failure to do so affects interstate commerce. Construing the 
Commerce Clause to permit Congress to regulate individuals 
precisely because they are doing nothing would open a new and 
potentially vast domain to congressional authority.  Every day 
individuals do not do an infinite number of things.  In some cases 
they decide not to do something; in others they simply fail to do 
it.  Allowing Congress to justify federal regulation by pointing to 
the effect of inaction on commerce would bring countless 
decisions an individual could potentially make within the scope 
of federal regulation, and—under the Government's theory—
empower Congress to make those decisions for him.48  
 
It is noteworthy how this statement is not supported by any legal authority.  
Instead, Chief Justice Roberts tortuously tries to distinguish the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate under the Commerce Clause from 
the Court’s 1942 decision in Wickard v. Filburn,49 which held that Congress 
had Commerce Clause authority to limit the quantity of wheat that farmers 
could grow for non-commercial consumption.50  The Chief Justice writes: 
 
Wickard has long been regarded as “perhaps the most far reaching 
example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity,” 
but the Government's theory in this case would go much further. 
Under Wickard it is within Congress' power to regulate the 
market for wheat by supporting its price.  But price can be 
supported by increasing demand as well as by decreasing supply. 
The aggregated decisions of some consumers not to purchase 
wheat have a substantial effect on the price of wheat, just as 
decisions not to purchase health insurance have on the price of 
insurance.  Congress can therefore command that those not 
buying wheat do so, just as it argues here that it may command 
that those not buying health insurance do so.  The farmer in 
Wickard was at least actively engaged in the production of wheat, 
and the Government could regulate that activity because of its 
                                                           
 48. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2587. 
 49. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 50. Id. at 128–29. 
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effect on commerce. The Government's theory here would 
effectively override that limitation, by establishing that 
individuals may be regulated under the Commerce Clause 
whenever enough of them are not doing something the 
Government would have them do.51 
 
This statement shows no deference to Congressional findings and disregards 
the reality that all Americans consume health care, regardless of their 
insurance status.  
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent discusses how Chief Justice Roberts’s 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence is both a marked departure from the Court’s 
prior precedent and contrary to her understanding of the framers’ intent, 
which never limited Congressional jurisdiction only to those “actively 
engaged in commercial transactions.”52  She notes that unlike the relevant 
provision of the Agricultural Adjustment Act at issue in Wickard and the 
Controlled Substances Act in Gonzales v. Raich,53 “Congress’ actions are 
even more rational in this case, where the future activity (the consumption of 
medical care) is certain to occur, the sole uncertainty being the time the 
activity will take place.”54 
Unlike Chief Justice Roberts and the four dissenting conservative 
associate justices, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent makes a plea for judicial 
restraint and argues the proper check on Congressional power under the 
Commerce Clause should be political and not judicial.55  Unlike liberals who 
have lauded Chief Justice Roberts’s decision to uphold the Act, Justice 
Ginsburg criticizes the decision from the perspective of a liberal jurist 
concerned with the national government’s future capacity to enact social 
welfare legislation.56 
Rebutting Chief Justice Roberts and the conservative justices’ claim that 
the Act’s survival under the Commerce Clause would provide the federal 
government with unlimited regulatory power, Justice Ginsberg writes that the 
Act does not mandate the purchase of an unwanted product:   
 
Rather, Congress is merely defining the terms on which 
individuals pay for an interstate good they consume:  Persons 
subject to the mandate must now pay for medical care in advance 
(instead of at the point of service) and through insurance (instead 
of out of pocket).  Establishing payment terms for goods in or 
                                                           
 51. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2617 (internal citations omitted) (quoting U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)).  
 52. Id. at 2621 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 53. See 545 U.S. 1, 7 (2005). 
 54. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2619 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 55. See id. at 2614–15. 
 56. See id. at 2609. 
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affecting interstate commerce is quintessential economic 
regulation well within Congress’s domain.57 
 
Justice Ginsberg’s dissent, in the end, rebuts Chief Justice Roberts’s claimed 
distinction between economic activity and inactivity by describing an 
individual’s decision not to purchase insurance as a choice to remain self-
insured, which, in turn, is an economic decision.58   
Indeed, Justice Ginsburg notes Chief Justice Roberts’s interpretation of 
the Commerce Clause will have baneful consequences for national welfare 
because States cannot resolve the problem on their own and because doing so 
would place them at a competitive disadvantage as compared with 
neighboring States.  She writes: 
 
Like Social Security benefits, a universal health-care system, if 
adopted by an individual State, would be “bait to the needy and 
dependent elsewhere, encouraging them to migrate and seek a 
haven of repose.”  An influx of unhealthy individuals into a State 
with universal health care would result in increased spending on 
medical services.  To cover the increased costs, a State would 
have to raise taxes, and private health-insurance companies would 
have to increase premiums.  Higher taxes and increased insurance 
costs would, in turn, encourage businesses and healthy 
individuals to leave the State.59 
 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent demonstrates how the Chief Justice’s decision was 
nothing less than an activist limitation on the scope of Congressional power 
under the Commerce Clause.  
Why did the Chief Justice choose to narrow Congressional power under 
the Commerce Clause while expanding its power under the Taxing and 
Spending Clause?  Was this choice justified?  
 
B. The Act’s Constitutionality under the Taxing and Spending Clause 
 
Chief Justice Roberts’s conclusion as to the Act’s constitutionality under 
the Taxing and Spending Clause and unconstitutionality under the Commerce 
Clause accomplished two things. First, it allowed the Chief Justice to avoid a 
direct confrontation with the Obama Administration and ensure that the 
Court’s legitimacy would not be at issue in the forthcoming Presidential 
                                                           
 57. Id.; see also United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 118 (1942) (recognizing that 
“Congress plainly has power to regulate the price of milk distributed through the medium of interstate 
commerce”). 
 58. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2622 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 59. Id. at 2612 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644 (1937)). 
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election. Second, and more importantly, it enabled Chief Justice Roberts to 
obtain the Obama Administration’s acquiescence in a decision that greatly 
narrows the federal government’s legislative power.  This is because it is 
easier for Congress to socialize the cost of its legislative enactments by way 
of the Commerce Clause regulations than it is to pay for these programs via 
tax increases and government spending.  Fearing the political consequences 
of this aspect of the Chief Justice’s decision, the Obama Administration’s 
position remains that the mandate is a penalty and not a tax.60  Meanwhile, 
Republican Party politicians, such as former Alaska Governor and former 
Republican Vice-Presidential candidate, Sarah Palin, have accused President 
Obama of lying about the individual mandate and imposing a tax on the 
American public.61  Recognizing that Chief Justice Roberts’s decision greatly 
limits the federal government’s power to enact social welfare legislation, the 
esteemed conservative public intellectual and Washington Post columnist, 
George F. Will, writes: 
 
If the mandate had been upheld under the Commerce Clause, the 
Supreme Court would have decisively construed this clause so 
permissively as to give Congress an essentially unlimited police 
power—the power to mandate, proscribe and regulate behavior 
for whatever Congress deems a public benefit.  Instead, the court 
rejected the Obama administration’s Commerce Clause doctrine.  
The court remains clearly committed to this previous holding: 
“Under our written Constitution . . . the limitation of 
congressional authority is not solely a matter of legislative grace.”   
 
The court held that the mandate is constitutional only because 
Congress could have identified its enforcement penalty as a tax.  
The court thereby guaranteed that the argument ignited by the 
mandate will continue as the principal fault line in our polity.62 
 
Did Chief Justice Roberts properly treat the mandate as a tax when it is 
never labeled as such in the legislation?  Concerning the mandate’s penalty 
provision, Chief Justice Roberts writes, “[the provision] makes going without 
insurance just another thing the Government taxes, like buying gasoline or 
earning income.  And if the mandate is in effect just a tax hike on certain 
                                                           
 60. See George Stephanopoulos, Despite Ruling, Jack Lew Refuses to Call Health Care Mandate a 
Tax, ABC NEWS (July 1, 2012, 11:14 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/07/despite-ruling-
jack-lew-refuses-to-call-mandate-a-tax/. 
 61. See James Hohmann & Robin Bravender, Health Care Ruling: GOPers Pounce on SCOTUS Tax 
Talk, POLITICO (June 28, 2012, 11:29 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0612/77972.html.  
 62. George F. Will, Op. Ed., Conservatives’ Consolation Prize, WASH. POST (June 28, 2012, 2:53 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/george-will-supreme-court-gives-conservatives-a-consolation-
prize/2012/06/28/gJQAWyhY9V_story.html. 
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taxpayers who do not have health insurance, it may be within Congress's 
constitutional power to tax.”63  He further writes: 
 
The exaction the Affordable Care Act imposes on those without 
health insurance looks like a tax in many respects.  The “[s]hared 
responsibility payment,” as the statute entitles it, is paid into the 
Treasury by “taxpayer[s]” when they file their tax returns.  It does 
not apply to individuals who do not pay federal income taxes 
because their household income is less than the filing threshold in 
the Internal Revenue Code.  For taxpayers who do owe the 
payment, its amount is determined by such familiar factors as 
taxable income, number of dependents, and joint filing status.  
The requirement to pay is found in the Internal Revenue Code 
and enforced by the IRS, which—as we previously explained—
must assess and collect it “in the same manner as taxes.”  This 
process yields the essential feature of any tax: it produces at least 
some revenue for the Government.  Indeed, the payment is 
expected to raise about $4 billion per year by 2017.64 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the “shared responsibility payment” is never 
labeled a tax in the Act’s text or legislative history, Chief Justice Roberts 
calls it a tax because all penalties must be paid to the IRS in the same manner 
as taxes.  He further argues that the exaction is more akin to a tax than a 
penalty because failure to purchase insurance is completely legal under the 
Act 65  and because Congress estimates that approximately four million 
individuals will choose to pay the exaction rather than purchase private 
health insurance.66 
However, the fact that payment is made to the IRS and enhances 
government revenues does not resolve the issue of whether the mandate is a 
tax.  The Court had never previously changed legislation to place a tax label 
on what the legislation itself describes as a penalty.  The four conservative 
associate justices, in dissent, write: 
 
                                                           
 63. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2594. 
 64. Id. at 2594 (internal citations omitted). 
 65. See id. at 2596–97 (“Neither the Act nor any other law attaches negative legal consequences to not 
buying health insurance, beyond requiring a payment to the IRS.”); accord Transcript of Oral Argument at 
49–50, Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (Mar. 26, 2012) (No. 11-398) (petitioner 
stating that if an individual chooses to pay the IRS rather than obtain health insurance, that individual has 
complied with the law). 
 66. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2597 (majority opinion) (“That Congress apparently regards such extensive 
failure to comply with the mandate as tolerable suggests that Congress did not think it was creating four 
million outlaws.  It suggests instead that the shared responsibility payment merely imposes a tax citizens 
may lawfully choose to pay in lieu of buying health insurance.”). 
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But we have never held—never—that a penalty imposed for 
violation of the law was so trivial as to be in effect a tax.  We 
have never held that any exaction imposed for violation of the 
law is an exercise of Congress' taxing power—even when the 
statute calls it a tax, much less when (as here) the statute 
repeatedly calls it a penalty.  When an act “adopt[s] the criteria of 
wrongdoing” and then imposes a monetary penalty as the 
“principal consequence on those who transgress its standard,” it 
creates a regulatory penalty, not a tax.67 
 
Calling the exaction a tax cannot be justified solely because the payment is 
made to the IRS.  After all, it would have been ridiculous for the legislation 
to require the penalty to be paid to a different administrative body, such as 
the Department of Health and Human Services, when that body lacks the 
IRS’s revenue raising capabilities and would be at an administrative 
disadvantage in determining an individual’s eligibility for a penalty 
exemption.  The conservative dissenters write: 
 
Against the mountain of evidence that the minimum coverage 
requirement is what the statute calls it—a requirement—and that 
the penalty for its violation is what the statute calls it—a 
penalty—the Government brings forward the flimsiest of 
indications to the contrary. . . [W]hile the penalty is assessed and 
collected by the IRS, § 5000A is administered both by that 
agency and by the Department of Health and Human Services 
(and also the Secretary of Veteran Affairs), which is responsible 
for defining its substantive scope—a feature that would be quite 
extraordinary for taxes.68 
 
The four conservative dissenters further write that the Court had never 
previously classified as a tax what the legislation itself calls a “penalty.”69  
This is especially the case with the Act, where Congress never labeled the 
“shared responsibility payment” a tax but labeled the exaction a “penalty” no 
less than eighteen times in just one section of the Act.70 
Calling the penalty a tax is also problematic because the penalty’s 
purpose is solely to engender individual purchases of health insurance and 
not to raise national government revenue.71  This distinguishes the mandate’s 
penalty from sin taxes on alcohol and cigarettes and tariffs on imported 
                                                           
 67. See id. at 2651–52 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Bailey v. Drexel 
Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922)). 
 68. Id. at 2654 (internal citations omitted). 
 69. See id. at 2653. 
 70. See id. 
 71. See id.  
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goods, which, although intended to engender differences in consumer 
behavior, are also meant to enhance the public fisc.72  
The four dissenting conservative justices write that calling the mandate a 
tax is belied by the Act’s textual distinction between those who are exempted 
from the individual mandate and those who are exempted from the penalty.73  
They continue that “[i]f § 5000A were a tax, these two classes of exemption 
would make no sense; there being no requirement, all the exemptions would 
attach to the penalty (renamed tax) alone.” 74   The conservative justices 
conclude that the “nail in the coffin” is the Act’s very structure, i.e., both 
“the mandate and penalty are located in Title I of the Act, its operative core, 
rather than where a tax would be found–in Title IX, containing the Act’s 
‘Revenue Provisions.’”75 
The dissenting conservatives conclude that to call the penalty a tax “is 
not to interpret the statute but to rewrite it.”76  This rewrite is, from their 
perspective, problematic both constitutionally, as the Constitution requires all 
tax increases to originate in the House of Representatives, and from an 
institutional competency perspective, as the legislature is more accountable 
to the people and therefore should have the primary role in raising tax 
revenue.77 
Chief Justice Roberts saved the Act’s individual mandate by calling the 
penalty a tax that is authorized under the Constitution’s Taxing and Spending 
Clause.  The penalty, however, is never described as a tax, does not operate 
as a tax, and the Court’s jurisprudence had never previously countenanced 
such a rewrite of Congressional legislation.  Chief Justice Roberts’s decision 
to authorize the individual mandate under the Taxing and Spending Clause 
was most likely a political one based on an inclination to allow the Act to 
survive judicial review. 
 
C. The Decision Invalidates the Act’s Medicaid Mandate 
 
Finally, the decision further weakens the national government’s power 
with regard to the several States by invalidating the Act’s provision 
mandating the States to increase their Medicaid rolls or lose the entirety of 
their existing federal Medicaid funding.  Medicaid is a federally subsidized 
health care program that provides health care benefits to a limited class of 
individuals whose incomes range from 37% to 63% of federal poverty 
                                                           
 72. James Sadowsky, The Economics of Sin Taxes, 4(2) ACTON INST.: RELIGION & LIBERTY (Mar. & 
Apr. 1994), http://www.acton.org/pub/religion-liberty/volume-4-number-2/economics-sin-taxes.  
 73. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2653 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 2655. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. (“Imposing a tax through judicial legislation inverts the constitutional scheme, and places 
the power to tax in the branch of government least accountable to the citizenry.”). 
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levels.78  The Act requires the States to use federal funds to increase their 
Medicaid rolls to cover all persons whose incomes are below 133% of 
federal poverty guidelines or, should they refuse to implement the federally 
subsidized Medicaid expansion, lose the entirety their existing federal 
Medicaid funds. 79   Chief Justice Roberts’s concluded that this was an 
unconstitutional coercion of the several States.  He writes: 
 
Nothing in our opinion precludes Congress from offering funds 
under the Affordable Care Act to expand the availability of health 
care, and requiring that States accepting such funds comply with 
the conditions on their use.  What Congress is not free to do is to 
penalize States that choose not to participate in that new program 
by taking away their existing Medicaid funding.  Section 1396c 
gives the Secretary of Health and Human Services the authority to 
do just that.  It allows her to withhold all “further [Medicaid] 
payments . . . to the State” if she determines that the State is out 
of compliance with any Medicaid requirement, including those 
contained in the expansion.  In light of the Court's holding, the 
Secretary cannot apply § 1396c to withdraw existing Medicaid 
funds for failure to comply with the requirements set out in the 
expansion.80 
 
      Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts’s characterized the provision in the Act 
authorizing the Health and Human Services Secretary to withhold all 
Medicaid funds from States that do not comply with the Act as “a gun to the 
head.”81  He writes: 
 
A State that opts out of the Affordable Care Act's expansion in 
health care coverage thus stands to lose not merely “a relatively 
small percentage” of its existing Medicaid funding, but all of it.   
Medicaid spending accounts for over 20 percent of the average 
State's total budget, with federal funds covering 50 to 83 percent 
of those costs.  The Federal Government estimates that it will pay 
out approximately $3.3 trillion between 2010 and 2019 in order to 
cover the costs of pre-expansion Medicaid.  In addition, the States 
have developed intricate statutory and administrative regimes 
over the course of many decades to implement their objectives 
under existing Medicaid.  It is easy to see how the Dole Court 
could conclude that the threatened loss of less than half of one 
                                                           
 78. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601 (majority opinion). 
 79. See id.  
 80. Id. at 2607 (internal citation omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (Supp. 2011)). 
 81. See id. at 2604. 
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percent of South Dakota's budget left that State with a 
“prerogative” to reject Congress's desired policy, “not merely in 
theory but in fact.”  The threatened loss of over 10 percent of a 
State's overall budget, in contrast, is economic dragooning that 
leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce in the 
Medicaid expansion.82 
 
Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the requirement that States increase 
their Medicaid rolls or risk losing their existing Medicaid federal funds 
violates state sovereignty.  This is regardless of the fact that the Medicaid 
expansion is 100% funded by the federal government through 2016 and the 
subsidy will never drop below 90% of the Medicaid expansion’s total 
program cost.83 
Why is the threat to remove existing Medicaid funding unconstitutional?  
After all, the Act does not threaten to directly penalize State treasuries for 
lack of compliance, but merely to deprive them of existing federal subsidies.  
As noted in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, Congress would have acted 
constitutionally if it passed legislation ending all Medicaid subsidies to States 
and then passed a new version of Medicaid that imposed the Act’s terms.84  
In response, Chief Justice Roberts writes: 
 
Justice Ginsburg suggests that the States can have no objection to 
the Medicaid expansion, because “Congress could have repealed 
Medicaid [and,] [t]hereafter, . . . could have enacted Medicaid II, 
a new program combining the pre-2010 coverage with the 
expanded coverage required by the ACA.”  But it would certainly 
not be that easy.  Practical constraints would plainly inhibit, if not 
preclude, the Federal Government from repealing the existing 
program and putting every feature of Medicaid on the table for 
political reconsideration.  Such a massive undertaking would 
hardly be “ritualistic.”  The same is true of Justice Ginsburg’s 
suggestion that Congress could establish Medicaid as an 
exclusively federal program.85 
 
Although Chief Justice Roberts is most certainly correct about the feasibility 
of Justice Ginsburg’s counterfactual, it is not the Court’s place to evaluate 
the constitutionality of a proposed scenario based on its political plausibility.  
Indeed, as Justice Ginsberg sets forth in dissent, Congress could have simply 
                                                           
 82. See id. at 2604–05 (internal citations omitted). 
 83. See id. at 2601. 
 84. See id. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 85. Id. at 2606 n.14 (majority opinion) (internal citations omitted). 
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cut the several States out of the Act’s Medicaid expansion and, as it did with 
Social Security, constitutionally made it an entirely federal program.86  
The Chief Justice, however, focused on the Act’s coercive threat to 
withdraw existing federal Medicaid subsidies from States that refuse to 
implement the Act’s Medicaid expansion.  He distinguishes this coercion 
from that found and upheld in South Dakota v. Dole.87  Dole involved a 
federal statute that directed the Secretary of Transportation to withhold 5% of 
the federal highway funds otherwise payable to the State if the State allowed 
for the sale of alcoholic beverages to persons less than twenty-one years 
old. 88   South Dakota’s challenge to the statute under the Twenty-First 
Amendment was rejected by the Court, which concluded that (1) Congress’s 
age condition was directly related to safe interstate travel; (2) there was no 
restriction on how the highway funds were to be used; and (3) the 5% penalty 
constituted only “relatively mild encouragement to the States.”89  If anything, 
however, the relevant statute in Dole is far more intrusive of state 
sovereignty than the Act because, among other things, the Twenty-First 
Amendment guarantees the States sole jurisdiction to regulate alcohol 
consumption.  Contrasting the Act with the applicable statute in Dole, Justice 
Ginsberg writes: 
 
The ACA, in contrast, relates solely to the federally funded 
Medicaid program; if States choose not to comply, Congress has 
not threatened to withhold funds earmarked for any other 
program.  Nor does the ACA use Medicaid funding to induce 
States to take action Congress itself could not undertake.  The 
Federal Government undoubtedly could operate its own health-
care program for poor persons, just as it operates Medicare for 
seniors' health care.90 
 
The Chief Justice’s decision concluded the Medicaid expansion 
improperly coerced states into expanding their Medicaid rolls because the 
Act authorized the Health and Human Services Secretary to withhold 
pre-expansion Medicaid subvention to recalcitrant States. 91   The Chief 
Justice did this based on his own conservative and federalist jurisprudence.  
The weakness with his position is that the Court’s most relevant precedent, 
Dole, if anything, supports the Medicaid expansion’s constitutionality.  As 
noted in Justice Ginsberg’s dissent, Chief Justice Roberts’s conclusion is 
                                                           
 86. See id. at 2632–33 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 87. 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 88. See National Minimum Drinking Age Act, 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1984); 483 U.S. at 203. 
 89. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 211. 
 90. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 91. See id. at 2608 (majority opinion). 
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neither completely logical nor necessarily federalist.92  Congress could have 
easily and constitutionally repealed the existing Medicaid program and 
enacted a revised Medicaid program that required the expansion or “cut” the 
States entirely out of a revised Medicaid program.93  Despite this, the Chief 
Justice’s position is plausible, defensible, and consistent with his 
conservative and federalist beliefs.  Whatever else, Chief Justice Roberts 
successfully used the decision as a means to align the Court’s jurisprudence 




Chief Justice Roberts, however, saved the Act by severing the ostensibly 
unconstitutional coercion of state sovereignty to leave the law’s remainder 
intact.  He writes: 
 
The Court today limits the financial pressure the Secretary may 
apply to induce States to accept the terms of the Medicaid 
expansion.  As a practical matter, that means States may now 
choose to reject the expansion; that is the whole point.  But that 
does not mean all or even any will.  Some States may indeed 
decline to participate, either because they are unsure they will be 
able to afford their share of the new funding obligations, or 
because they are unwilling to commit the administrative resources 
necessary to support the expansion.  Other States, however, may 
voluntarily sign up, finding the idea of expanding Medicaid 
coverage attractive, particularly given the level of federal funding 
the Act offers at the outset.94 
 
In short, the Court “redrafted” the Act to authorize it under the Taxing and 
Spending Clause and preserved the Medicaid expansion by using the Act’s 
severability clause to allow States to opt out of the mandated Medicaid 
expansion.  As such, the Act will proceed into implementation and States can 
now refuse to expand their Medicaid rolls without risking the loss of existing 
federal Medicaid subvention.  
Chief Justice Roberts succeeded in issuing a decision that sets the 
Court’s jurisprudence in a markedly conservative and federalist direction 
while avoiding a confrontation with the Executive and preserving the body’s 
reputation for judicial restraint.  This decision was facilitated by the Act’s 
unique status as the most consequential piece of social welfare legislation 
signed into law by any President since the Great Society, by the Obama 
                                                           
 92. See id. at 2632–33 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 93. See id. 
 94. Id. at 2608 (majority opinion). 
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Administration’s announced willingness to politicize the Court’s legitimacy 
in the November 2012 election, and because the Act has focused the body 
politic and therefore does not risk a ratchet-type federal government 
expansion. 
  
VI.  THE DECISION’S CONSEQUENCES 
 
On the very day the Court issued its decision affirming the Act’s 
constitutionality, the President, speaking warmly of the decision, said:  
 
Earlier today the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
the Affordable Care Act, the name of the health care reform we 
passed two years ago.  In doing so, they've reaffirmed a 
fundamental principle: that here in America, in the wealthiest 
nation on earth, no illness or accident should lead to any family's 
financial ruin. . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
The highest court in the land has now spoken.  We will continue 
to implement this law.  And we'll work together to improve on it 
where we can, but what we won't do, what the country can't 
afford to do is refight the political battles of two years ago or go 
back to the way things were.  With today's announcement, it's 
time for us to move forward, to implement and, where necessary, 
improve on this law.95 
 
The President’s positive reaction was joined by Democrat-leaning 
columnists and pundits.  In a column titled Taking One for the Country, the 
New York Times chief foreign affairs columnist, Thomas Friedman, writes: 
 
I know that this was a complex legal decision.  But I think it was 
inspired by a simple noble leadership impulse at a critical 
juncture in our history—to preserve the legitimacy and integrity 
of the Supreme Court as being above politics.  We can’t always 
describe this kind of leadership, but we know it when we see it 
and so many Americans appreciate it.96 
 
                                                           
 95. Lynn Sweet, Obama Reacts to Supreme Court: "What This Means for You" Transcript, CHI. SUN-
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2013 CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN “MARSHALL” ROBERTS 23 
Similarly, the Washington Post columnist, E. J. Dionne, writes: 
 
Roberts’ rulings on Citizens United and a variety of labor and 
regulatory issues fed fears that he would happily take on the role 
as the leader of a right-wing judicial revolution—and there is still 
reason to worry that this is exactly what he'll do on many other 
issues, notably affirmative action.  But on health care, Roberts 
chose to blunt these attacks.  He cast himself as a jurist sensitive 
to the obligation of the courts to show at least some deference to 
the government's elected branches on matters of social policy.  He 
took what might have been a center-left decision upholding the 
entire law and nudged it to the center or center-right.  What he did 
not do—and this is to his credit—was join the right end of the 
court that wanted to gut the act.97 
 
In short, Chief Justice Roberts’s decision meant the Obama 
Administration and the liberal segment of the American political culture 
accepted a decision that greatly narrowed the Commerce Clause, such that 
the national government will find it difficult to pass social welfare 
legislation to equalize what is presently one of the most unequal countries, 
as measured by income, wealth, and life expectancy, in the developed 
world.98  
Recognizing this reality, some conservative columnists wrote flatteringly 
of the Chief Justice’s decision notwithstanding their philosophical objections 
with the Act.  The very influential neoconservative Washington Post 
columnist Charles Krauthammer, in a column titled Why Roberts Did It, 
writes: 
 
It’s the judiciary’s Nixon-to-China: Chief Justice John Roberts 
joins the liberal wing of the Supreme Court and upholds the 
constitutionality of Obamacare.  How?  By pulling off one of the 
great constitutional finesses of all time.  He managed to uphold 
the central conservative argument against Obamacare, while at 
the same time finding a narrow definitional dodge to uphold the 
law—and thus prevented the court from being seen as having 
overturned, presumably on political grounds, the signature 
legislation of this administration. 
 
                                                           
 97. E. J. Dionne, A Win for President Obama, and Chief Justice John Roberts, COM. APPEAL 
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Why did he do it? Because he carries two identities.  
Jurisprudentially, he is a constitutional conservative.  
Institutionally, he is chief justice and sees himself as uniquely 
entrusted with the custodianship of the court’s legitimacy, 
reputation and stature.99 
 
George F. Will writes: 
 
By persuading the court to reject a Commerce Clause rationale 
for a president’s signature act, the conservative legal insurgency 
against Obamacare has won a huge victory for the long haul.  
This victory will help revive a venerable tradition of America’s 
political culture, that of viewing congressional actions with a 
skeptical constitutional squint, searching for congruence with the 
Constitution’s architecture of enumerated powers.  By rejecting 
the Commerce Clause rationale, Thursday’s decision reaffirmed 
the Constitution’s foundational premise:  Enumerated powers are 
necessarily limited because, as Chief Justice John Marshall said, 
“the enumeration presupposes something not enumerated.”100 
 
This is not to say that reaction to the decision was unanimously positive.  
Many conservative commentators and academicians were highly critical of 
the Court’s decision, but political reaction from the right was muted and 
reaction from the liberal left was overwhelmingly positive.  Most 
importantly, the Chief Justice’s decision, by sustaining the Act, ensured the 
Court’s legitimacy would not be an issue in the forthcoming Presidential 
election.  Rather, the election will focus on whether Americans should vote 
for politicians who would, among other things, expand or repeal the Act.  
Chief Justice Roberts, like his greatest predecessor, issued a decision that 
furthered his jurisprudential objectives, enhanced the Court’s esteem, and 
avoided a direct confrontation with the executive branch. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
Chief Justice Roberts’s decision effectively “threaded the needle” by 
promulgating a decision that both avoids a direct confrontation with the 
Obama Administration and greatly narrows the national government’s 
powers vis-à-vis the several States.  Notwithstanding select conservative 
criticisms, Chief Justice Roberts’s decision enhances the Court’s legitimacy 
                                                           
 99. Charles Krauthammer, Op. Ed., Why Roberts Did It, WASH. POST, June 28, 2012, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/charles-krauthammer-why-roberts-did-
it/2012/06/28/gJQA4X0g9V_story.html.  
 100. Will, supra note 62. 
2013 CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN “MARSHALL” ROBERTS 25 
and evidenced a measure of judicial restraint.  Unlike his four conservative 
brethren, Chief Justice Roberts surely recognized that overturning the Act 
would have been the Court’s first decision to invalidate an Administration’s 
chief legislative accomplishment on Commerce Clause grounds since the 
New Deal era.  Neither the Gun-Free School Zones Act101 in Lopez,102 nor 
the Violence Against Women Act103 in United States v. Morrison104 were 
significant legislative accomplishments for any Congress or President and the 
Court’s invalidation of these statutes on Commerce Clause grounds did not 
risk either its legitimacy or institutional prestige within the broader political 
culture.  The Court’s legitimacy and prestige, however, was affected in Bush 
v. Gore when the Court decided the disposition of Florida’s electoral college 
votes to determine the outcome of the 2000 Presidential election and when it 
invalidated, on First Amendment grounds, many of the nation’s existing 
campaign finance laws.105 
The Court’s reputation would have been further eroded were it to have 
invalidated the Act, which is the most significant piece of social welfare 
legislation enacted since the Great Society era.  In any event, the Act is the 
type of legislation that focuses the political culture such that its ultimate fate 
will be determined by the political process.  Accordingly, conservatives can 
rest assured that the decision will not risk a ratchet-type growth of federal 
government power as perhaps might have been the case with the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act and Violence Against Women Act in Lopez and Morrison, 
respectively. 
Chief Justice Roberts’s decision upholding the Act reminds us of our 
greatest Chief Justice’s decision in Marbury that avoided a direct 
confrontation with the Jefferson Administration to establish the Court’s 
judicial review power over both executive and legislative actions and 
adumbrated the Judiciary’s eventual status as an equal branch of the federal 
government.  Like his greatest predecessor, Chief Justice Roberts issued a 
carefully reasoned decision that institutionally strengthens the Court, avoids 
a potentially damaging fight with the executive branch, and furthers his own 
jurisprudential goals.  
The Chief Justice’s decision is based on logic that is far from foolproof.  
His Commerce Clause jurisprudence is both activist and a marked departure 
from the Court’s prior precedent to limit the national government’s power.  
Moreover, his decision to avoid a confrontation with the Executive and 
authorize the individual mandate’s penalty as a tax is both remarkable in its 
                                                           
 101. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988) (forbidding “any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at 
a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone”). 
 102. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 103. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (1994) (stating that “persons within the United States shall have the right 
to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender”). 
 104. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 105. See 531 U.S. at 110. 
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originality and tenuous based on the Court’s prior precedent and the Act’s 
legislative history and text.  However, the Chief Justice’s foremost duty, as 
custodian of the Court, is to preserve the Court’s institutional prestige in the 
broader American polity.  After the Obama Administration signaled its 
willingness to politicize the Court’s decision-making in the forthcoming 
Presidential election, the Chief Justice’s role as custodian of the Court’s 
reputation most likely took precedence over his inclination to invalidate the 
law on both conservative and federalist principles.  Notwithstanding both 
legitimate and plausible jurisprudential objections to the decision from both 
conservatives and liberals, Chief Justice Roberts issued a decision that both 
protected the Court’s role as final arbiter of judicial disputes and left the 
issue of how Americans use and distribute their increasingly scarce health 
care resources to the political process.  The decision, in the end, was an act of 
patriotism. 
